In order to counter their opponents’ increasingly sophisticated drone operations, several militias supported by Iran have recently obtained loitering surface-to-air missiles. These missiles are effectively explosive drones that hunt for airborne targets in a looping motion.
Without question, the most common is the 358 produced in Iran. Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi militias supported by Iran have acquired these air-breathing loitering missiles since the US Navy intercepted a shipment of them in 2019.
It looks like an air-to-air missile, the 358. A 22-pound warhead adorns the roughly 9-foot-long cylinder that is the 358, as reported in Iran’s state-run media. According to the source, it has the capability to reach a height of 28,000 feet, but its main purpose is to intercept drones that are flying low in the sky.
“The Iranian 358, surface-to-air system, has become a staple of groups allied to Iran,” stated James Patton Rogers, who is the executive director of the Cornell Brooks Tech Policy Institute at Cornell University and the author of Precision: A History of American Warfare, in an interview with Business Insider.
“Utilized by the Houthis, as the Saqr/Hawk, the loitering munition proved effective against Saudi drone systems and was even deemed a threat against US aircraft operating in the region by the Pentagon,” stated Rogers. “Reports of the 358 being used against Israeli drones by Hezbollah have also surfaced, making the system one of the most widely used and effective across the Middle East.”
An uncommon weapon is the 358. In addition to being able to be fired from a primitive launcher similar to the ones used by terrorists, it is anticipated to be driven by a jet engine similar to those seen in cruise missiles after rising initially on a rocket motor. Small gas turbine engines manufactured by a Dutch manufacturer powered the 358 missiles that the US Navy confiscated.
The missile “flies in a figure-eight pattern” over a predetermined region, waiting for adversaries to use the optic sensor in their seeker heads to latch onto it. When the missile gets close to its target, it can detonate its warhead using infrared proximity fuses. It appears to be programmed to remain stationary in one spot until it either detects an enemy or exhausts its fuel supply.
Fighter planes in the air shouldn’t be worried about these missiles because they’re so much slower than regular surface-to-air missiles. While sophisticated drones like Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 have been tracking some organizations for some time, the increasing number of these devices in the hands of terrorists might provide them with a whole new weapon.
“Medium-altitude long-endurance drones, like those adopted by Turkey, are especially vulnerable as they have been designed for use in regions where command of the air is maintained,” added Rogers. “In addition, any low-flying aviation, such as helicopters or aircraft coming in to land at remote bases, might be under increased threat.”
“Yet this is just the start of an offensive-defensive cycle, with states adapting their drones with defense systems and groups seeking ever longer range and more powerful air defense measures,” said Rogers.
According to senior RANE risk intelligence analyst Ryan Bohl, the 358-type missile has had “some notable successes.”
“They offer a certain degree of flexibility for Hezbollah, untying their anti-air defense network from being completely anchored on geography by allowing them to loiter in the skies,” BI said. “Still, they have not yet demonstrated the capability to close the skies to Western combat aircraft, and so they must be seen as a hindrance to Israeli combat operations rather than a substantial block.”
Regarding the 358 and other similar loitering missiles, Rogers expressed concern that they might “likely continue to be deployed widely, leading to the worrying potential of escalation as the US and its allies respond to attacks on their military systems.”
“As air defense systems increase in power and effectiveness, it will mark a new challenge to drone systems that have long had command of the air,” said Rogers. “We are seeing a renewed age of offensive/defensive challenges and a new age of contested airspace.”
Drone Hunting Drones
According to a March report, the PKK, Turkey’s bitter enemy, may have obtained Iranian Meraj hovering rockets. The PKK has recently claimed to have shot down thirteen Turkish drones over Iraqi Kurdistan, and these statements are in line with that.
“With variants of the Meraj family of ‘drone hunting drones’ documented in Iraq, it is technically possible that the PKK has obtained such systems, either directly from Iran or otherwise,” stated Rogers.
The 532, the most sophisticated Meraj system, he said, can reach heights of up to 12,000 feet. Turkish drones may reach altitudes of forty thousand feet, such as the Akinci and Bayraktar TB2.
“While it remains possible that the PKK has found ways to smuggle or illegally obtain Iranian systems, it would be in limited quantity given that Tehran has its own issues with the PKK and little interest in supplying an anti-Turkish faction with such systems for fear of upsetting Turkish-Iranian relations,” according to Bohl.
“This seems, at least on a strategic level, to be far-fetched.”
If the PKK wants to “overcome” Turkey’s massive “drone and logistical advantages,” Bohl claims it would need a lot more Meraj hovering systems. The RANE expert believes that if the organization has acquired or smuggled some, they “could be of localized, tactical consideration for individual PKK-Turkey encounters.”
“The real constraint for non-state actor use is their supply; they need some kind of firm supply line to a state that manufactures them since few of them can be cobbled together in makeshift factories,” according to Bohl.
Although the 358 has caused some headaches with drone interceptions and other air activities, it hasn’t blocked any airspace for American or other military operations and probably won’t.
“I think the loitering drones factor in as less of the end of Western air dominance in the region and more of a way for less advanced powers to have at least some layers of air defense against these rivals,” said Bohl. “That could contrast with groups like ISIS, which have virtually no air defenses whatsoever and must endure Western air power in any confrontation.”
“For Iran and its allies, they’ll have networks of air defenses that add deterrence to escalation, but don’t necessarily block air operations, especially covert ones by stealth units.”